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The Effect of Earned Versus HouseMoney on
Price Bubble Formation in Experimental
AssetMarkets*
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PRAVEEN KUJAL3 and DAVID PORTER1
1Economic Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics,
Chapman University, 2University of Granada, and 3Middlesex University
Abstract. Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset
market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed
from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion
are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in
accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cog-
nitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low
CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below)
fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.
JEL Classification: C92, D03, G12
1. Introduction
Do individuals make different economic decisions when they use their own
money (“earned money”) compared to when they do not (“house money”)?
Evidence of a “house money effect” was found by Thaler and Johnson
(1990) in a lottery choice experiment. They found that subjects were more
likely to exhibit risk-seeking behavior in the presence of a prior gain. This
result raised the question about the robustness of experimental results where
subjects make decisions using house money.
The effect of house money has been examined in bargaining and income
redistribution experiments. When money is earned, subjects tend to recog-
nize merit and divide money among subjects according to their respective
contributions (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Konow, 2000; Oxoby and
Spraggon, 2008). In ultimatum games when money is not earned, merit
* The authors acknowledge financial support from grant [ECO2012/00103/001] from the
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 The Authors 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association.
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does not play a role and subjects are more likely to share the initial endow-
ment equally (Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Gu¨th and Tietz,
1988).1 But Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) show that, in a dictator
game, 95% of the dictators follow game-theoretic predictions by not
transferring any amount to the other player when they earned their
wealth. Reinstein and Reiner (2012) obtain similar findings in a charitable
giving game. In these studies, subjects earn money prior to deciding upon the
allocation of the outcome by answering a quiz (Cherry, Frykblom, and
Shogren, 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008), playing a simple hash mark
game (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985), adding numbers (Reinstein and
Reiner, 2012), or stuffing and folding envelopes (Konow, 2000). On the
other hand, Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren (2005) find no evidence of the
house money effect in voluntary contribution games. The variability of
results across different games suggests that the effect may also be specific
to the environment being tested.
Even though most of the previously mentioned research provides evidence
of a house money effect in bargaining games, it is not clear how these results
extend to market games of exchange.
HOUSE MONEY VERSUS EARNED MONEY IN ASSET MARKETS
It is well known that prices in experimental asset markets do not follow the
theoretical prediction and bubbles are commonly observed with inexperi-
enced subjects (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988). Experimental asset
markets are characterized by persistent (average) price deviation from fun-
damental value in early periods, with prices significantly above fundamental
as the market progresses and then a crash to fundamental value at the end.
The question we address is whether the use of house money to endow initial
portfolios of cash and shares to subjects encourages the “mispricing” found
in experimental asset markets.
Specifically, we investigate whether traders behave differently when they
earn their starting endowment (“Earned Money treatment”) than when they
do not (“House Money baseline”) in experimental asset markets with price
bubbles and crashes. Asset market bubbles have been found to be robust to
treatments variations such as short selling, capacity to buy on margin,
brokerage fees, limit price change rules (King et al., 1993; Porter and
Smith, 1994) and assets generating certain dividends (Porter and Smith,
1 Note that despite extensive evidence of an effect of earned money on the allocation of
joint outcomes, Rutstrom and Williams (2000) report no significant differences in alloca-
tions whether endowments were earned or randomly generated.
2 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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1995). Further, even though the introduction of futures markets may reduce
bubble amplitude, it does not affect their duration (Porter and Smith, 1995).
Nevertheless, a complete set of futures (one for each of the fifteen periods)
seems to eliminate bubbles (Noussair and Tucker, 2006). Interestingly,
bubbles tend to disappear with twice-experienced subjects even when
experienced and inexperienced traders are mixed (Dufwenberg, Lindqvist,
and Moore, 2005). However, bubbles may still be observed among twice-
experienced traders when the market environment is modified by increasing
liquidity and dividend uncertainty (Hussam, Porter, and Smith, 2008). The
existence of bubbles has been partly ascribed to subjects’ irrational behaviors
(Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001). The authors find evidence of systematic
errors in decision making accompanying bubbles. Traders engage in unprof-
itable transactions at prices above the maximum possible or below the
minimum possible dividend stream.
The asset market environment is a good candidate to study the house
money effect as it is characterized by systematic deviations of market
prices from fundamental values in contradiction to the equilibrium predic-
tions obtained in market-clearing models (Tirole, 1982). In that context, we
may wonder whether the house money effect can account for part of the
discrepancy between the fundamental value of the asset and the prices
observed in the laboratory. Earlier research on the house money effect
offers little guidance to our current study as it mostly examines bargaining
games and aims at studying the role of house money on distributive prefer-
ences. Market experiments differ considerably from these settings as they do
not involve concerns for distributive preferences. The only work that con-
templates the potential effect of house money in a market environment was
conducted by Ang, Diavatopoulos, Schwarz (2010). The authors conducted
experimental asset markets (as a robustness check) in which subjects played
with their own money. No significant differences were found between the
house money and the own money cases. Besides natural concerns with a
possible selection bias, the authors’ results should be interpreted with
caution as they conducted only two experimental sessions with subjects’
own money. This small sample follows from the fact that the primary goal
of the authors was to assess the emergence of bubbles under different com-
pensation schemes, wealth and supply constraints, as well as the effect of the
relative risk aversion of traders rather than studying the house money effect
per se.
In order to study the effect of earned money in experimental asset
markets, we recruited subjects for a two-part experiment. In the first part,
subjects had to perform a 2 hour real effort task that consisted in developing
a database for a research institute. All subjects earned the same amount in
EARNEDMONEYANDBUBBLES 3
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this part and were told that their money was carried over for the experiment
which will be realized in the second part.2 In the second part, which took
place after 3 days, subjects participated in a standard experimental asset
market with certain dividends (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988;
Porter and Smith, 1995). The value of each subject’s initial portfolio
composed of both cash and shares was exactly equal to the fixed payment
earned from the first-day task ($31.5).3
Our main findings are that bubbles were similar in the house and earned
money treatments. However, relative to the house money treatment, trans-
action volumes were 31% lower in the earned money treatment. One of the
direct effects of reduced transactions is that the dispersion of earnings was
more pronounced in the house money compared with earned money treat-
ment. We investigate earnings dispersion further by categorizing subjects
according to their performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT)
(Frederick, 2005).4 We find that subjects with low CRT scores were net
purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental
value while the opposite was true for subjects with high CRT scores. As a
result, high CRT subjects earned more money on average than the initial
value of their portfolio while low CRT subjects earned less. This result was
true for both the house and earned money treatments.
2. Experimental Design and Hypothesis
2.1 PROCEDURE
One hundred and eighty subjects from a major university participated in the
house money (henceforth HM) and earned money (henceforth EM)
treatments.
2.1.a The HM treatment
In the baseline HM treatment, subjects only participated in the asset market
experiment for which they were endowed with a portfolio of cash and shares
worth $31.50 from the experimenter (house money). The HM experiments
were conducted as standard asset market experiments (Smith, Suchanek, and
Williams, 1988). Nine subjects each participated in a fifteen period asset
2 Further, we made no promises in terms of a safety net that subjects would be able to
recover the money from the experiment (as in Clark (2002)).
3 In addition, subjects were paid a $10 show-up fee for each appearance.
4 This 3-min questionnaire was administered while subjects waited for their payments at the
end of the experiment. As is common in this literature, the CRT was not incentivized.
4 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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market. Our only departure from the standard structure was that the
dividend was certain (Porter and Smith, 1995). This was dictated by the
design requirement of the EM treatment where we wanted to ensure that
subjects did not see their earned money being put to risk. A certain dividend
guaranteed that if the subjects simply held on to their shares and cash en-
dowment they would finish the market experiment with the amount of
money they had previously earned.
2.1.b The EM treatment
Subjects in the EM treatment were told that they will be participating in an
experiment that has two parts (Table I) with the second part taking place 3
days after the first part. Subjects were told that they will be performing a
task related to a database for a research institute in the first part and that the
amount earned in the task, $31.50, will be carried over to the second part.5
They were also informed that they would be paid in cash for the entire
experiment at the end of the second part. Including the 2-day show-up
fees subjects earned, on average, $51.50.6 As a result, in the EM treatment
final earnings were partially coming from show-up fees which were not
earned by subjects. The show-up fee, however, could not be used for
trading and, as such, differed from the endowment subjects receive in
standard experimental asset markets. In that respect, our treatment is one
of earned endowment. We did not have subjects earn their show-up fees
because the IRB rules at the laboratory where the studies were conducted
require that subjects cannot be recruited without being paid a show-up fee
(or their show-up fee being put at risk).7
In the first part of the experiment, subjects performed a task requiring
(real) effort of 2 h. The task performed by the subjects was intended to
resemble as closely as possible a short-term job.8 We ensured that subjects
were aware of the economic significance of their work task by explicitly
stating in the instructions that the database to be developed was going to
be used by a research institute (which was indeed the case). In order to stress
5 See Appendix B for instructions.
6 The show-up fee was $10 each day. A high show-up fee was used in this treatment to
ensure that subjects who participated in the first day experiment would come back for the
second. This was indeed the case for all subjects but one.
7 In addition, recruiting subjects who would accept to earn their show-up fees may create
selection effects possibly attracting a high proportion of risk lovers and overconfident
subjects.
8 This task is similar to that in Falk and Ichino (2006) where recruited students folded
papers and stuffed envelopes to prepare the mailing of a questionnaire study for the
University of Zurich.
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the difference between a standard laboratory experiment and the work task
(in the EM treatment), we conducted the two parts, that is the work task and
the experimental asset market, on two separate days.9
In our work task, subjects had to search and download academic articles
into a file folder with the objective of building a database. Subjects had to
search on JSTOR for the articles, download them and copy them into a file
folder. If they could not copy any article then they had to state the exact
reason as to why it was not downloaded.10 All subjects were paid the same
fixed wage of $31.50 for the task irrespective of the effort made. This was
done to ensure that the starting endowment for all the subjects was the same
in the asset market experiment. Subjects were told in the instructions (see
Appendix B) that they were “expected to search a minimum of 20 articles in
a JSTOR database and download them to a personal folder with their name
(that will be identified later)”. A great majority of subjects (83%) were able
to download twenty articles or more.11 On average (median) subjects down-
loaded 25.4 (25.0) articles, with the maximum number of articles being 44
and the minimum being 11 (see Figure 1 for a histogram of the number of
downloaded articles).
Table I. Experimental parameters: earned money treatment
First day—task Second day—asset market
 2 h
 Download academic articles from JSTOR
 Earned $31.50
 Money credited to buy asset market portfolio
in the second part of the experiment
 Continuous double auction
 One asset traded
 15 periods (4min each)
 Fixed and known dividend of 24 cents
 9 subjects per market
 Initial endowment ($31.50):
 4 shares & 1,710 cents
 5 shares & 1,350 cents
 6 shares & 990 cents
9 Also, the monitors who were in charge of supervising subjects in the work task were
different from the experimenters conducting the second part of the experiment. This
constant supervision also helped to avoid shirking behavior from subjects.
10 The most common reason for an article not being downloaded was lack of availability
due to different restrictions on download permissions.
11 After having run all the experiments, we noticed that one subject in one session
participated in the asset market experiment without having attended the first day.
Excluding this session from the analysis does not affect the results of the article.
6 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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In the second part, the subjects participated in an asset market experiment
(Table I). Each experiment had nine subjects. Each asset earned a fixed
dividend of 24 cents in each period and lasted for fifteen periods. Subjects
started the experiment with four, five, or six shares and had cash endow-
ments of 1,710, 1,350, or 990 cents, respectively. The total value of the en-
dowment equaled $31.50 dollars for all subjects, which is exactly equal to the
money they earned in the prior task. Subjects were told several times that
their earnings will be used in the asset market experiment. For example,
subjects were informed explicitly that:
(i) Before participating in this experiment, you earned $31.50 by working
on the database for the research institute during 2 hours. This full
amount of cash will be used to pay for your initial portfolio in the
current experiment.
We provided each subject with detailed calculations regarding the value of
their initial portfolio which was composed of both cash and shares (see
Instructions page 3 in Appendix C). We then clarified the link between the
work task completed in the first part of the experiment and the initial port-
folio endowment.
(ii) Notice that the value of your initial portfolio corresponds to the
earnings in the 2 hours you spent working on the database.
Point (ii) was further repeated in the experimental summary at the end of
the instructions where subjects were told that the initial value of their port-
folio ($31.50) corresponded to the earnings they obtained in the work task 3
days ago. This was done to ensure that the subjects knew that they were
Figure 1. Histogram of number of downloaded articles.
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playing with the amount they earned in the earlier task. We summarize our
experimental design in Table II.
2.1.c CRT
To complement our analysis of the effect of earned money on individual
behavior, we collected data regarding subjects’ cognitive ability at the end of
each experimental session. We used the CRT as a measure of cognitive
ability (Frederick, 2005). The CRT has been found to correlate with
general measures of intelligence as well as different aspects of individual
decision making such as risk and time preferences (Frederick, 2005;
Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz, 2009) and levels of reasoning (Bran˜as-
Garza, Garcı´a-Mun˜oz, and Herna´n-Gonza´lez, 2012). The CRT consists of
the following three questions:
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
(2) If it takes five machines 5 min to make five widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
The CRT score corresponds to the total number of correct answers and
varies from 0 to 3.
2.2 HYPOTHESIS
Bubbles in experimental asset markets are characterized in many dimensions
such as price deviations from fundamental value, duration, and trade
volume. If house money has an effect it will be manifested in changes in
these measures. It seems natural to suppose (and as suggested by Thaler and
Johnson, 1990) that subjects might engage in greater speculative behavior
when they have none of their own money at stake and that this speculative
Table II. Experimental design
Treatment
Number of subjects
per sessions
Number of
sessions
House Money Baseline 9 10
Earned Money Treatment 9 10
8 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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behavior will likely result in higher trading volumes and mispricing. If, as
Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) and Kirchler, Huber, and Stu¨ockl (2012)
suggest, bubbles are a manifestation of some underlying confusion about
the market environment, then earned money should have no effect. Given
this, we examine the following null hypothesis in our experiments.
Hypothesis: Earned money will have no effect on the characteristics of price
bubbles.
3. Results
We use different measures of bubbles considered in the literature in order to
check for differences between treatments and also to compare with results
reported by other authors. We consider the following measures of bubbles:12
(1) Amplitude: measures the trough-to-peak change in asset value relative
to its fundamental value. This is measured as, A¼Max{PtftE : t¼
1 . . . 15}Min{PtftE : t¼ 1 . . . 15}. Where, Pt is the average market
price in period t, ft is the fundamental value of the asset in period t,
and E is the expected dividend value over the life of the asset.
(2) Duration: measures the length, in periods, in which there is an observed
increase in market prices relative to the fundamental value of the asset.
Formally, duration is defined as:
D ¼ Maxfm: Ptft < Ptþ1  ftþ1 < . . . < Ptþm  ftþmg:
(3) Haessel-R2 (Walter W. Haessel, 1978): measures goodness-of-fit
between observed (mean prices) and fundamental values. It is appro-
priate, since the fundamental values are exogenously given. Haessel-R2
tends to 1 as trading prices tend to fundamental values.
(4) Normalized average price deviation (NAV): sums up the absolute de-
viation between the average price and the fundamental value for each
of the fifteen periods. It is defined as follows:
NAV ¼
X15
t¼1
jPt  ftj
15
:
(5) Normalized absolute price deviation (NAP): as defined in Haruvy and
Noussair (2006), NAP measures the per-share aggregate overvaluation
12 See Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) and Corgnet, Kujal, and Porter (2010).
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(or undervaluation), relative to the fundamental value of the asset in a
given period and is defined as:
NAP ¼
XK
k¼1
jPk  fkj
100 45 ;
where, Pk is the price of the k-th transaction in the experiment, 45 the
total number of shares, 100 is a normalization scalar, and fk is the
fundamental value of the asset when the k-th transaction takes place.
Large values of NAP reflect volumetric deviations from fundamentals.
This measure is similar to the normalized average price deviation.
However, NAV does not depend on the number of trades and can
then be used to compare the extent of mispricing in sessions with dif-
ferent levels of trading volumes.
(6) Turnover: measures the volume of share transactions relative to the
number of shares on issue in the market:
Turnover ¼
XT
t¼1qt
45
;
where, T is the number of trading periods, qt is the number of trans-
actions in period t and 45 is the total number of shares in the market
which in our case is equal to 45.
3.1 BUBBLE CHARACTERISTICS
In Figure 2, we plot per period median price for each session in the HM
treatment. Interestingly, although prices always start below the fundamental
value, in three of our sessions average prices keep close to the fundamental
value for most of the periods. Table III reports bubble measures for each
session.
We confirm the results of Porter and Smith (1995) by not identifying
significant differences in bubble measures when comparing experimental
asset markets with certain dividends versus markets with asset markets
with uncertain dividends.13 We perform a comparison of different bubble
measures for treatments with randomly drawn dividends and inexperienced
subjects against our HM experiments (see Table AI in Appendix A). We find
13 We compare our results (with certain dividends) with the results of Corgnet, Kujal, and
Porter (2010) (uncertain dividends).
10 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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that bubble measures do not differ significantly from those obtained in the
HM treatment when considering standard significance levels.14
Figure 3 shows per-period median price for the EM treatment. Though
differing in magnitudes, bubbles form in 6 out of 10 cases in the HM treat-
ment and in 5 out of 10 cases in the EM treatment. From Figures 2 and 3,
one can see significant mispricing in both the house money and the EM
treatments. We reject the equality of all bubbles measures between the
HM and EM treatments using a multivariate test (p¼ 0.38).15
Looking at each bubble measure separately (Table III), we observe no
significant differences between the house money and the EM treatment
except for NAP (p¼ 0.01) and turnover (p¼ 0.07). A lower NAP tells us
that relative to the HM experiments, and considering all transactions, prices
in the EM treatment were closer to the fundamental value. Average trading
volumes are 31% lower in the EM treatment compared with the HM treat-
ment. Note that NAP is, by definition, closely linked to trading volumes.
Figure 2. Period median prices in the House Money treatment.
14 We use a multivariate test comparing all bubble measures in our study and in Corgnet,
Kujal, and Porter (2010). We report a p-value of 0.21. When comparing each bubble
measure separately (see Table A2 in Appendix A), we report marginally significant differ-
ences for amplitude and NAP between our house money treatment and the baseline treat-
ment in Corgnet, Kujal, and Porter (2010).
15 We used command sr.loc.test in R to do these spatial rank tests of multivariate location.
We obtained similar values using a Hotelling’s T2 test (p¼ 0.41).
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NAP automatically increases with an increase in the number of transactions
K as long as transactions are completed at prices that are not exactly equal to
fundamental values. The fact that the measures of mispricing that are not
affected by trading volumes, such as NAV and Haessel-R2 values, do not
differ across treatments suggests that there are no significant differences in
the pattern of prices across treatments. We conclude that the difference in
the NAP measure across treatments is mostly driven by differences in trading
volumes. We summarize our findings as follows.
Result 1: We find that the earned money treatment has no significant effect
on asset mispricing, but has a significant effect on measures of trading
volume.
Table III. Average bubble measures for different treatments
aMannWhitneyWilcoxon test.
Treatment Session Amplitude Duration Haessel-R2 NAV NAP Turnover
House money
1 0.58 9 0.65 59 4.7 7.4
2 1.19 13 0.38 130 13.4 10.5
3 0.53 3 0.82 25 2.1 4.3
4 1.05 14 0.48 116 7.7 7.9
5 0.85 4 0.35 53 4.7 4.9
6 0.28 5 0.95 19 3.1 7.98
7 0.49 7 0.81 66 3.0 5.38
8 0.90 6 0.00 95 8.1 4.96
9 1.73 11 0.72 194 14.7 8.31
10 0.76 10 0.84 70 2.5 3.98
Earned Money
1 0.46 6 0.82 29 1.5 3.0
2 0.60 4 0.80 37 1.3 2.9
3 0.84 5 0.53 69 1.8 3.0
4 0.52 8 0.92 81 2.8 2.5
5 0.74 4 0.61 27 2.0 5.8
6 1.13 12 0.69 116 9.2 8.8
7 0.53 7 0.79 40 3.3 5.2
8 0.24 2 0.97 12 1.0 4.8
9 0.39 7 0.84 37 2.7 5.5
10 0.56 5 0.88 29 2.1 4.0
House Money
Average 0.84 8 0.60 83 6.4 6.7
Median 0.80 8 0.68 68 4.7 6.4
Earned Money
Average 0.60 6 0.78 48 2.8 4. 6
Median 0.55 6 0.81 37 2.1 4.4
MWWa (p-values) 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.07
12 B. CORGNET ETAL.
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Finally, we investigate the distribution of subjects’ earnings across treat-
ments. Figure 4 below shows a histogram of subjects’ earnings at the end of
the experiment for each treatment.16
We observe that the dispersion of earnings, measured by their standard
deviation and the Gini coefficient, is significantly greater in the HM treatment
than in the EM treatment (Table IV). Note that a crucial element in explaining
differences in earnings dispersion across treatments is the difference in trading
volumes (K) between the earned money and the HM treatment.17
Figure 3. Period median prices in the Earned Money treatment.
16 We obtain a positive but not significant correlation between subject’s performance in the
task (number of articles downloaded) and either their CRT score (Spearman’s r¼ 0.1013,
p¼ 0.36) or their earnings in the asset market experiment (Spearman’s r¼ 0.1087, p¼ 0.31).
We also ran a regression of the number of articles downloaded controlling for subjects’
earnings and CRT score (or a dummy that takes value 1 for positive CRT scores, and zero
otherwise) and found that all the coefficients were not significantly different from zero (all
p’s> 0.38).
17 The variance of earnings increases in K. Indeed, let us consider a market with two
traders, each of them being endowed with the same amount of cash C. Let us call B the
number of times trader 1 is buying the asset while S is the total number of times trader 1 is
selling the asset. The variance of earnings can then be expressed as follows: Var½CþPBb¼1
ðfb  PbÞ þ
PS
s¼1ðPs  fsÞ where fbðfsÞ is the fundamental value of the asset when trader 1
buys (sells) the asset for the bth(sth) times. Also, PbðPsÞ is the price of the asset when trader 1
buys (sells) the asset for the bth(sth) times. Assuming that prices are independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables with variance s2 then the variance of earnings is:
(Bþ S)s2 ¼Ks2.
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Interestingly, we find that earnings dispersion by session, measured by the
standard error of subject’s earnings, is highly correlated with trading volumes
(Spearman’s r¼ 0.697, p¼ 0.03 and r¼ 0.746, p¼ 0.01 for the HM and EM
treatments, respectively).18
Our findings regarding earnings dispersion are summarized as follows.
Result 2: Compared with the house money treatment, earnings dispersion is
significantly lower in the earned money treatment.
In the next section, we examine the correlation between CRT scores and
individual trader behavior.
3.2 CRT CORRELATES
The CRT scores provide one, among other possible, measures of subjects’
cognitive skills (Frederick, 2005) which can be used to sort subjects accord-
ingly. Table V provides subject score (0, 1, 2, 3) on the CRT and its rela-
tionship with subjects’ earnings across treatments.
In Table V, we compare earnings for subjects with a CRT score of zero
with earnings for subjects with scores greater than zero (last column).19 With
Figure 4. Histogram of subjects’ earnings by treatment.
18 Similar values are found using Gini coefficients instead of standard deviations of
subjects’ earnings (Spearman’s r¼ 0.649, p¼ 0.04 and r¼ 0.709, p¼ 0.02 for the HM and
EM treatments, respectively).
19 The same procedure has been used in Bran˜as-Garza, Garcı´a-Mun˜oz, and Herna´n-
Gonza´lez (2012). Our results are stronger if we compare the tails of the CRT scores dis-
tribution (subjects with 0 and 3 scores only).
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house money, subjects with a CRT score of zero earn on average $22.31,
which is 40% less than the subjects who have positive CRT scores ($37.08,
MWW, p¼ 0.0012). This result also holds for the treatment with earned
money (MWW, p¼ 0.0021). However, this difference in earnings across
subjects with different CRT scores is lower when subjects use their own
money (EM treatment). In particular, the earnings of subjects with a CRT
score of zero were 12% larger in the EM treatment compared with the HM
treatment while the earnings of subjects with a positive CRT score were 9%
lower (MWW, p¼ 0.5692 and p¼ 0.4553, respectively). In addition, subjects
with a CRT score of three earned 120.9% more than those with a score of
zero in the HM treatment (MWW, p< 0.001), whereas the difference in
earnings between these subjects was only equal to 40.4% in the EM treat-
ment (MWW, p< 0.001).
Table IV. Subjects’ final earnings
aMannWhitneyWilcoxon test.
Treatment Session Standard error Gini coefficient
House Money
1 28.64 0.45
2 32.61 0.53
3 20.55 0.34
4 17.88 0.30
5 21.68 0.36
6 26.73 0.41
7 13.24 0.20
8 14.59 0.25
9 23.26 0.39
10 12.56 0.21
Earned Money
1 14.90 0.23
2 11.37 0.19
3 7.04 0.10
4 7.91 0.13
5 15.44 0.24
6 24.34 0.39
7 23.55 0.39
8 9.03 0.15
9 17.79 0.27
10 18.71 0.30
House Money
Average 21.17 0.35
Median 21.11 0.35
Earned Money
Average 15.01 0.24
Median 15.17 0.23
MWWa (p-values) 0.08 0.05
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In Figure 5, we show subjects’ average portfolio value at the end of each
period by CRT score. From the very beginning, subjects with a higher CRT
score earn more money and this difference increases over time. Interestingly,
HM subjects earning differences across CRT scores are even larger. Under
EM, subjects with a higher CRT score cannot take full advantage of subjects
with low scores.20
We summarize our results regarding CRT scores and earnings as follows.
Result 3: Subjects with positive CRT scores earn significantly more than
subjects with a zero CRT score. Differences in earnings across subjects
with different CRT scores are significantly more pronounced in the house
money treatment than in the earned money treatment.
This result is in line with the recent work of Cueva and Rustichini (2012)
according to which subjects with high cognitive skills measured with non-
verbal IQ tend to outperform subjects with low cognitive skills.
Table V. Baseline treatment—mean (median) earnings
[Number of observations].
aMannWhitneyWilcoxon test. This test reports the comparison of subjects’ earnings with
CRT¼ 0 and subjects with CRT> 0.
CRT 0 1 2 3 >0
MWWa
(p-values)
House Money $ 22.31 $ 35.71 $ 30.45 $ 49.29 $ 37.08 0.0012
($ 22.12) ($ 35.21) ($ 32.33) ($ 40.75) ($ 35.57)
[34] [24] [19] [13] [56]
Earned Money $ 25.07 $ 33.53 $ 31.98 $ 35.19 $ 33.71 0.0021
($23.49) ($ 34.88) ($ 31.64) ($ 35.83) ($ 34.34)
[23] [27] [17] [23] [67]
20 For each treatment, we ran a panel data regression, with random effects and clusters by
session, of subjects’ portfolio value on a dummy variable capturing CRT scores (CRTd which
takes value one if the subject’s CRT is positive and value zero otherwise), period dummies,
and the interaction effect. The portfolio value of subjects with positive CRT scores is signifi-
cantly higher than those subjects with zero CRT scores. Interestingly, in the HM treatment
the difference in the portfolio value increases over time, as the coefficients of the period
dummies (with respect to the first period, omitted) are negative and decrease over time for
subjects with zero CRT score, while they are positive and increase over time for subjects with
positive CRT score (the coefficients of all the fifteen interaction terms, CRTdPeriod, are
significant, all p’s< 0.095). In the EM treatment, however, the difference in portfolio value by
CRT remains constant across periods (no period dummy is significant, and the coefficients of
all the fifteen interaction terms are not significant either, all p’s> 0.143).
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Now, we study trading patterns in more detail to uncover some of the
possible reasons for the observed differences in subjects’ earnings. In par-
ticular, we study whether subjects were net buyers or net sellers of the asset
when the price was lower or higher than the fundamental value of the asset.
We compute the number of net purchases per period as the number of pur-
chases minus the number of sales of an individual for that period. Table VI
presents the results of a panel data, with random effects and clusters by
session, of the net number of purchases on a dummy variable capturing
CRT scores (CRTd) and on the difference between the average period
price and the fundamental value relative to the fundamental value (PtFVtFVt ).
We show that subjects with a CRT score of zero are net buyers (sellers) when
the asset price is above (below) the fundamental value since the coefficient
associated with the variable (PtFVtFVt ) is positive and significant. Note that this
result is statistically significant for the HM treatment, whereas it is only
marginally so in the EM treatment. Subjects with a CRT score greater
than zero are net buyers (sellers) when the asset price is below (above) the
fundamental value since the coefficient associated with the variable
[ðPtFVtFVt Þ þ CRT
d  ðPtFVtFVt Þ] is negative and significant. This finding is
particularly interesting as it shows that high CRT subjects may be feeding
the bubble in the early stages of the experiment and get out of it before it
crashes. Further, the effect of CRT score on net purchases is more
pronounced in the HM treatment than in the EM treatment.
Figure 5. Portfolio value at the end of each period.
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Our findings regarding trading patterns across subjects with different
CRT scores are summarized as follows:21
Result 4: Subjects with positive CRT scores buy (sell) shares when the asset
price is below (above) the fundamental value. Subjects with a zero CRT
score behave in the opposite manner.
This result means that in our asset market experiments, which is a zero-
sum game, there is a transfer of earnings from subjects with low CRT scores
to subjects with high CRT scores. High CRT subjects purchase shares in
the early periods, when prices are below the fundamental value and sell
those shares when the prices exceed the fundamental value (see left panel
of Figure 6). This transfer of wealth is less pronounced in the EM treatment
(see right panel of Figure 6).
Table VI. Subjects’ number of net purchases by period
CRTd¼ 0 if subject’s CRT¼ 0 and 1 otherwise. Pt is the (session) average price of period t.
FVt is the fundamental value of period t.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, and ***p< 0.01.
Variables House Money Earned Money
Constant 0.0689 0.1282*
CRTd 0.1001 0.1716*
PtFVt
FVt
0.0765** 0.0689*
CRTd  PtFVtFVt
 
0.1358** 0.1144**
R2 0.0053 0.0021
Wald chi2 9.02** 7.04*
PtFVt
FVt
 
þ CRTd  PtFVtFVt
 
0.0593** 0.0455**
21 We also studied differences in the total number of transactions for all treatments (and
number of transactions by treatment across periods) by CRT score and did not find any
significant differences (MWW, p¼ 0.923 and p¼ 0.410 in treatment HM and EM, respect-
ively). This result holds across periods (MWW, most p’s> 0.164 for all periods and treat-
ments, except for period 8 in the Earned Money treatment, p¼ 0.074).
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4. Conclusion
In this article, we have studied the house money effect in an experimental
asset market with bubbles and crashes. We found that even though bubbles
still occurred in the EM treatment, trading volumes were significantly
reduced. The reduction in trading volumes implied a significant decrease
in the dispersion of subjects’ earnings in the EM treatment compared with
house money.
We investigated earnings dispersion by categorizing subjects according to
their cognitive ability which was measured using the CRT. We found that
subjects with lower CRT scores were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when
the price was above (below) fundamental value while the opposite was true
for subjects with higher CRT scores. Consequently, high CRT subjects
earned more money on average than the initial value of their portfolio
while low CRT subjects earned less. This result was true for both the
house and EM treatments.
Our main conclusion is that there is indeed a house money effect in ex-
perimental asset markets. The house money effect manifests itself in trading
volume that subsequently affects earnings dispersion. Bubbles, however, are
maintained and we find no differences between our two treatments, or
comparing our results with other experiments with uncertain dividends.
We take a preliminary step by studying individual behavior in asset
markets as reflected by the well-known CRT. We use the CRT to sort
subject behavior in asset markets and find that cognitive abilities, as reflected
Figure 6. Average number of shares held at the end of the period by CRT score and across
periods for house money (on the left panel) and for earned money (on the right panel).
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by the CRT, do seem to matter. Individuals with a high CRT score feed the
bubble in the early stages and get out of it in later periods. Further research
needs to be done to better understand the link between cognitive abilities and
bubble formation in experimental asset markets.
Our findings also shed light on the ongoing discussion regarding excessive
trading in financial markets where average mutual-fund turnover has
increased from 15% in the 1950s to around 100% in 2011 (Edelen, Evans,
and Kadlec, 2013). This excessive trading which could be explained by in-
vestors’ overconfidence and urge to “do something” (Dow and Gorton,
1997; Odean, 1999) could be tamed by redesigning incentive packages of
fund managers. For example, a proportion of their base salary could be
automatically invested in their clients’ portfolio.
Appendix A: Comparison with other studies
Bubble measures in our HM treatment and those reported by Corgnet et al.
(2010) are not significantly different when using a multivariate test
(p¼ 0.21).22
Table AI. Average bubble measures for related studiesa
aAll of them are studies with the same number of periods (15) and traders (9). Data
obtained from Corgnet, Kujal, and Porter (2010).
Amplitude Duration NAV NAP
House Money 0.84 8.2 6.4 82.7
Corgnet, Kujal, and Porter (2010) 1.26 10.3 11.2 130
Smith, Van Boening, and Wellford (2000) 1.39  5.5 
Porter and Smith (1995) 1.53 10.1  
King et al. (1993) 1.61 9.5 11.8 
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 1.24 10.2 5.7 
22 We used command sr.loc.test in R to do these spatial rank tests of multivariate location.
We obtained similar values using a Hotelling’s T2 test (p¼ 0.21).
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Appendix B: Instructions Part I (Task)
Instructions:
. This is a study in decision-making. Funding for this project has been
provided by several funding agencies.
. You will be taking part in an experiment that consists of two parts.
In the first part, you will be required to perform a task related to a
Research Institute database.
. The amount earned in the first task is credited to your account and
will be used in the second part. In the second part, you will be
participating in an economic experiment.
. The amount you will earn in the first task will be carried over to the
experiment you will take part in the second part. You will be paid IN
CASH for the entire experiment at the end of the second part that
will take place at the end of this week.
Table AII. Average bubble measures comparing HM treatment and Corgnet, Kujal, and
Porter (2010)’s baseline sessions with random dividend
aMWW stands for the MannWhitneyWilcoxon test.
Session Amplitude Duration Haessel-R2 NAV NAP
Upward
trend
Num
transactions Turnover
House
Money
1 0.58 9 0.65 59 4.7 3 334 7.4
2 1.19 13 0.38 130 13.4 11 473 10.5
3 0.53 3 0.82 25 2.1 2 194 4.3
4 1.05 14 0.48 116 7.7 9 355 7.9
5 0.85 4 0.35 53 4.7 4 220 4.9
6 0.28 5 0.95 19 3.1 1 359 8.0
7 0.49 7 0.81 66 3.0 2 342 5.4
8 0.90 6 0.00 95 8.1 6 223 5.0
9 1.73 11 0.72 194 14.7 11 374 8.3
10 0.76 10 0.84 70 2.5 3 179 4.0
Corgnet
et al.
N11 1.08 9 0.33 119 10.9 5 121 5.5
N21 1.37 12 0.10 137 9.5 9 132 6.0
N31 1.33 5 0.59 134 13.2 5 143 6.5
House
Money
Average 0.84 8 0.60 83 6.4 5 295 6.7
Median 0.80 8 0.68 68 4.7 4 288 6.4
Corgnet
et al.
Average 1.26 9 0.34 130 11.2 6 132 6.0
Median 1.33 9 0.33 134 10.9 5 132 6.0
MWWa (p-values) 0.06 0.87 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.44  >0.99
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Today’s Task:
. In this part you will be performing a task for a Research Institute
database.
. You have a list of academic articles on your desk.
. You are expected to search a minimum of 20 articles in a JSTOR
database and download them to a folder (that will be identified
later).
. You will be credited $31.50 for this task.
Where to save the articles?
. Please, right click on the mouse and create a new folder on the
desktop.
. Please, name the folder now using your own complete name.
. You will be saving the articles into this folder.
How to save an article?
. For example, the article:
 Edward L. Glaeser, David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman,
Christine L. Soutter, 2000, Measuring Trust, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 811846.
. Go to, http://www.jstor.org/
. Then select Economics.
. Type in the name of the journal, e.g., “Quarterly Journal of
Economics”
. Go to the corresponding year and page numbers
. Click on the article and save it to your folder.
How do I download the article from JSTOR?
. Once you find the article you will find a screen similar to the one
below
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 click on View pdf on the right hand side.
. Then click on proceed to pdf.
. Then right-click on the article to save as in your folder in the format
mentioned earlier.
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Format of the saved article
Author1&Author2_TitleofPaper_JournalInitialsYear.pdf
. For example, the article:
 Edward L. Glaeser, David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman,
Christine L. Soutter, 2000, Measuring Trust, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 811846.
. Will be saved as, Glaeser&Laibson&Scheinkman&Soutter_Measur-
ing Trust_ QJE2000.pdf
. Note: Journal initials are the first letters of the journal title.
 For example, for Quarterly Journal of Economics the initials are
QJE, for Economic Journal the initials are EJ, for American
Economic Review the initials are AER etc . . .
What if you do not find the article on JSTOR?
. Move on to the next article on the list.
. Please state on the handout that the article was not available.
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What if the journal is not available on JSTOR?
. State on the handout that the journal is not available on JSTOR and
move on to the next article on your list.
. Please make sure that all articles are saved using the naming format
we provide above.
Appendix C: Instructions Part II (Asset Markets)
INSTRUCTIONS (1/14)
This is an experiment in market decision making. You will be paid in cash
for your participation at the end of the experiment. Different participants
may earn different amounts. What you earn depends on your decisions and
the decisions of others.
[(Only EM treatment) Before participating in this experiment, you
earned $31.50 by working on the ESI database during 2 hours. This full
amount of cash will be used to pay for your initial portfolio in the current
experiment.]
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you
are seated. If you have any questions during the instruction round, raise your
hand and a monitor will come by to answer your question. If any difficulties
arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and someone will
assist you.
INSTRUCTIONS (2/14)
In this experiment you will be able to buy and sell a commodity, called
Shares, from one another.
At the start of the experiment, every participant will be given some Cash
and Shares.
The shares last for EXACTLY 15 periods of trading. After each
trading period the share will earn a dividend of 24 cents. Thus, if you had
a share at the end of period 1, you would get a return of 24 cents for that
period.
If you held a share from period 1 until the end of period 15, then
that share would return to you a total of $3.60 (15 24 cents) over the
15 periods. Similarly, if you bought a share in period 2 and held it from
period 2 until the 15th period, the accumulated dividends would be $3.36
(14 24 cents).
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INSTRUCTIONS (3/14)23
You will start the experiment with six shares and 990 cents in cash. The
initial value of your portfolio is identical and equal to $31.50. This is the case
because the total dividend value of each share over the 15 periods is equal to
$3.60 (15 24 cents):
990 centsþ 6 $3:60 ¼ 31:50:
[(Only EM treatment) Notice that the value of your initial portfolio corresponds
to the earnings in the 2 hours you spent working on the ESI database.]
INSTRUCTIONS (4/14)
During every period, traders can buy or sell shares from one another by
making offers to buy or to sell.
Every time a trade is made, it will be shown as a dark GREEN dot in the
graph located on the left of the lower part of your screen. Transactions are
also listed on theMarket Book located on the right of the graph. If you buy a
share (or somebody sold it to you), the cell in the Market Book will be shown
in light BLUE. The cell will be shown in RED if you sell a share (or
somebody buys it from you). The cells that are shown without colors
correspond to transactions in which you are not involved either as a buyer
or as a seller.
Figure C1. Lower part of your trading screen (graph and market book).
23 This part of the instructions was specific to each subject’s initial portfolio. The initial
endowment of cash and number of shares were 990, 1,350, or 1,710 cents and 6, 5, or 4
shares, respectively.
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INSTRUCTIONS (5/14)
To enter a new order to buy or to sell a share, type in the price at which you
would like to buy, or sell, in the appropriate Add order to Buy box or Add
order to Sell box. Click the Add order to Buy or Add order to Sell button to
submit your order.
INSTRUCTIONS (6/14)
Every time someone posts an order to buy a share, it will be added to the list
of best orders to buy (in the BLUE quadrant). This list shows only the best
FOUR orders. Every time someone makes an offer to sell a share, it will be
Figure C2. Upper part of your screen (Buy and Sell).
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added to the list of the best orders to sell (in the RED quadrant). This list
shows only the best FOUR orders.
The orders to buy will be listed from the highest price to the lowest price,
while the orders to sell will be listed from the lowest price to the highest price.
Your own orders in this list will be highlighted in ORANGE. For example,
you have just posted an order to sell at a price equal to 202 and this cor-
responds to the third best order in the market (that is, the third lowest order to
sell). This order will appear in the third place in the list of orders to sell.
INSTRUCTIONS (7/14)
To accept an existing order from another participant, click the Buy a share at
or Sell at share at buttons located on the right of the list of orders to sell and
orders to buy, respectively. The list of orders to buy shows you the four
highest orders to buy that are currently available on the market, while the list
of orders to sell shows you the four lowest orders to sell. By clicking on the
Buy a share at button, you buy at the listed price of 104 in the current
example; by clicking on the Sell at share at button, you sell at the listed
price of 96 in the current example. Your own existing orders to buy or sell
are highlighted in ORANGE.
In the situation illustrated in the following screen shot, the best order to
sell corresponds to a price of 104 (the lowest value in the list of orders to
sell). This is the price at which you can currently buy the share. The best
order to buy corresponds to a price of 96 (the highest value in the list of
orders to buy since this is the only order to buy currently available). This is
the price at which you can currently sell the share.
Figure C3. Upper part of your screen (Orders to buy and to sell).
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INSTRUCTIONS (8/14)
Whenever you enter new orders to buy, or sell, you will have those orders
listed in a table below the list of orders to buy and sell. By double clicking on
any cell in the table, you can cancel your own orders.
INSTRUCTIONS (9/14)
At the end of every period, each share will pay a dividend of 24 cents. The
dividend for each period will appear in the Dividends Table.
The earned dividends (for shares) of each period will be added to the cash
account of the holder.
The number of your shares will change, only when you buy, or sell, shares.
Notice that you cannot place orders to buy for an amount that is greater
than your current Cash. The information regarding the remaining cash
available to buy is displayed in the box below your current Cash. Also,
you cannot place more orders to sell shares than the Number of shares you
currently hold. The information regarding the remaining shares available to
sell is displayed below your current Number of shares.
Figure C4. Upper part of your screen (Orders to buy and to sell).
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INSTRUCTIONS (10/14)
During a period and each time you place an order or complete a transaction
a message will appear in the box above the dividends table. This message box
provides indications on whether your order or transaction has been
completed successfully. For example, if you attempt to buy a share at a
price that is higher than your current cash holdings, a message will appear
in the box stating that you do not have sufficient cash to buy this share.
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INSTRUCTIONS (11/14)
An example:
Suppose you have 5 shares and 150 in Cash at the start of a period, and
you make one transaction during the period purchasing a share for 110
cents within the period, and the dividend for the period is 24 cents, then:
Your Cash holdings will increase by 34 cents (Dividends of 24 times 6
shares minus a purchase at 110). Your new cash holding will thus be
150þ 34¼ 184 cents.
Your share holdings will increase from 5 to 6 units.
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INSTRUCTIONS (12/14)
Another example:
At the end of the previous period, you had 4 shares and 242 in Cash.
Suppose in the next period you make two transactions. You sell one
share for 130 and another share for 110, and the dividend for the period is
24, then:
Your Cash holdings will increase by 288 cents (Dividends of 24 times 2
shares plus sales of 130 plus 110). Your new cash holding will thus be
242þ 288¼ 530 cents.
Your share holdings will, however, decrease from 4 to 2 units.
INSTRUCTIONS (13/14)
This experiment will last for 15 periods. Each period will last for several
minutes. The remaining time (in seconds) will appear on the top of your
screen.
When the time is about to expire, the color will change to RED.
We will have a short practice period to allow you to become familiar with
entering orders and making trades.
INSTRUCTIONS SUMMARY (14/14)
(1) You will be given an initial amount of Cash and Shares.
(2) Every share generates a dividend of 24 cents at the end of each of 15
trading periods.
(3) You can submit orders to BUY shares and orders to SELL shares.
(4) You make trades by buying at the current lowest order to sell or selling
at the current highest order to buy.
(5) The market lasts for 15 periods. At the end of period 15, there will be
one last dividend draw. After that the share expires and is worth
nothing to you.
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(6) The initial value of your portfolio is equal to $31.50 (¼990 centsþ 6
shares $3.60).24 [(Only EM treatment) This amount corresponds to the
earnings you obtained in the 2 hours you spent working on the ESI
database.]
Click “Ready” to start the experiment.
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